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Terrorism Review

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6 September 1984

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*GI TR 84-019
6 September 1984*

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Terrorism Review

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*This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence.
 Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other
 agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.
 Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor*

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Terrorism Review ☐

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6 September 1984

Highlights**Key Indicators****Colombia**

Cease-Fire Agreements Signed. The People's Liberation Army (EPL) and the 19th of April Movement (M-19) signed cease-fire agreements with the Government of Colombia on 23 and 24 August 1984, respectively. The two groups announced their intentions to join with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in pursuing their objectives by peaceful means. However, the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia's other guerrilla movement, refuses to sign a truce and intends to continue its armed struggle. Dissidents from FARC, M-19, and EPL are also likely to continue acts of terrorism. ☐

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Spain

GRAPO Activities May Soon Increase. The small leftwing terrorist organization First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) reportedly plans to initiate a new terrorist campaign this fall in an effort to force the Spanish Government to agree to release imprisoned GRAPO members in return for a cessation of the campaign. ☐

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☐ While the group probably lacks the capability to carry out a large-scale attack, it can try for selective assassinations. GRAPO has occasionally targeted US interests in the past. ☐

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Significant Developments**United Kingdom**

Pro-Qadhafi Libyan Murdered. Ali El-Giahour, one of six Libyans awaiting trial for bomb attacks in London last March, was found shot to death in a London apartment on 20 August. The victim was one of two suspects who had been released on bail. British police have no clues as to who did the killing but say it has the earmarks of a professional job. El-Giahour apparently was lured to the apartment by his assassin. ☐

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Because the victim was not a hardline member of the pro-Qadhafi group that carried out the bombings, we suspect the Libyan Government may have been responsible—perhaps Tripoli believed he was an opportunist who became involved in the bombing effort simply to prove his revolutionary credentials. On the other hand, Libyan dissidents may have killed the man as an act of revenge ☐

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Iran

Massive Bomb Kills 18, Wounds 300. On 23 August, a 25-kilogram bomb hidden in a juice vendor's cart exploded outside the Tehran railroad station, leaving at least 18 people dead and more than 300 others wounded, according to Tehran radio. ☐

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The Iranian Government blamed the opposition group Mujahedin-e Khalq, now based in Paris, but a group spokesman denied the charge and condemned the attack on civilians. Although the group has conducted attacks like this in the past, it has recently been trying to improve its image and now routinely denies responsibility for attacks that hurt innocent civilians. Meanwhile in Tehran, an anonymous phone caller claimed that the "Unit of Martyr Khalaghi," a previously unknown group, had been responsible for the blast. Baghdad, which has ties both with the Mujahedin and with various other dissident Iranian minority groups and has sponsored similar attacks in Iran in the past, may have been somehow involved.

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This explosion, the first in Tehran in two years, came one week before the third anniversary of the bombing that killed Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Rajai in 1981. Official Iranian media say that whoever set the bomb intended to discredit the government's publicity campaign—scheduled to begin the next day—to tout its domestic achievements.

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Lebanon

Reuter Correspondent Kidnaped. Jonathan Wright, a British correspondent for Reuter news service, was kidnaped on 30 August. Wright left Beirut by car, intending to go to the Bekaa Valley to report on the results of the 28 August Israeli raid, but he never arrived there. On 3 September, an anonymous caller to AFP in Paris claimed Wright is being held by the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) as a protest against the "colonialist role" of Britain, which he claimed was in league with "imperialist plots against Muslims throughout the world." ROSM surfaced in March, claiming responsibility for the murder of Kenneth Whitty, an official of the British Council in Athens. We have no other information about the group.

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Attacks on Embassies. Two recent attacks on foreign embassies in West Beirut indicate the implementation of the security plan in the capital has not hindered terrorist operations.

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On 24 August, some 300 pro-Iranian Shias stormed the consular section of the Saudi Embassy and set the building on fire, allegedly because of difficulties in obtaining visas to attend the Hajj. There were no Saudi diplomats in the building during the attack, which may have been made under Tehran's instructions. An anonymous caller to a news agency in Paris later claimed the Islamic Jihad Organization would attack Saudi interests throughout the Muslim world if Riyadh does not ease restrictions on Hajj pilgrims. The Saudis accused the Lebanese Government of knowing about the attack in advance but still not preventing it. Because of the continuing threat to its personnel, the Saudi Government closed its embassy and withdrew the remainder of its diplomatic mission from Beirut.

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
Earlier in the day, gunmen fired two rocket-propelled grenades at British Embassy offices in West Beirut, causing extensive damage but no casualties. The Lebanese National Resistance Front, a loosely organized group of Palestinians and mainline

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Shias, which usually targets Israeli interests in southern Lebanon, claimed credit for the attack, charging that the United Kingdom is supporting Israel's operations in Lebanon. ☐ 25X1



Pakistan and Afghanistan

Soviet Targets Attacked. On 18 August in Karachi, the office of the Soviet airline Aeroflot was damaged by a bomb thrown from a car carrying four men. Two police guards were injured by flying glass as was one of the attackers, who subsequently fled the scene. Police later arrested four suspects, probably Afghans. Although no group has claimed credit for the attack, some Afghan resistance groups had vowed increasing attacks on Soviet facilities in retaliation for the 28 July car bombing of a resistance headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan. ☐

On 19 August in Kabul, several rockets reportedly hit the Soviet Embassy compound, causing some damage and wounding three Soviets. On the evening of 19 August, the Soviet-built polytechnic college was rocketed, and six Soviets may have died. The Soviet Embassy was reportedly fired upon again on 22 and 24 August, but we have no information about any damage. On the evening of 22 August, mortar and rocket rounds intended for the Soviet cultural and housing complexes narrowly missed their targets, killing as many as 17 Afghan civilians. ☐

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India-UAE

Second Sikh Skyjacking Resolved. On 24 August Sikh terrorists hijacked an Indian domestic airliner and diverted it from Srinagar to Lahore, Pakistan. Although armed initially only with their ceremonial daggers, the seven skyjackers apparently obtained one or two pistols from accomplices in Lahore. They demanded to speak with the hijackers of the Indian flight on 5 July, now being held in a Lahore jail, and wanted the plane to be refueled for a flight to the United States. ☐

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After an intermediate stop in Karachi, the plane was permitted to land in Dubayy. There the hijackers surrendered after the UAE Defense Minister, acting under the erroneous impression that the United States would consider accepting them, granted them a week's grace period to arrange onward passage to the United States. After a week of intense US-UAE negotiations, on 2 September the skyjackers were returned to India aboard a US-chartered aircraft. ☐

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Colombia

Terrorist Threat Forces Evacuation of US Ambassador. On 23 August the US Ambassador was advised by the Colombian Foreign Minister to "take a vacation" out of the country for the next eight days. The Foreign Minister was concerned [] that the Ricardo Franco Front was becoming increasingly determined to kill the Ambassador, even if it suffered casualties of its own in the process. The group has been plotting for several months to try to kill him using a car bomb. In response to the warning, the Ambassador and his family departed Bogota the same day, ostensibly for consultations in the United States. []

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Guatemala

US Peace Corps Volunteer, Guatemalan Citizen Kidnaped. On the evening of 14 August, an American and a Guatemalan were kidnaped from their homes by six armed men and driven to an unknown site where they were kept overnight, handcuffed and blindfolded. The next morning they were interrogated separately. The American was asked questions indicating his captors had read letters from his girlfriend in the United States; he was also asked about "the codeword" and about "making contact." Apparently satisfied with their answers, the captors drove the two to a drainage ditch where they were released. At that time, the captors stated they were from the Guatemalan Communist Party, an insurgent group. Despite this claim, the Peace Corps volunteer believes his captors worked for the Guatemalan Army because:

- The weapons used resemble ones he previously saw in Army hands.
- The kidnapers operated openly, and police took no action although they were aware of the incident.
- He overheard the captors discussing the Army Academy.
- He thinks he could discern berets and hear practice range gunfire at the interrogation site.

The US State Department has directed the US Embassy to make a formal protest to the Guatemalan Government. []

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Civilians Executed by ORPA. On 31 August, a local bus traveling between Quezaltenango and Colomba was stopped by three members of the Organization of People in Arms. According to press accounts []

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[] the guerrillas collected money from passengers, and then asked if anyone aboard the bus was a member of the Civil Defense Force (CDF), a kind of local militia. One man who answered yes was taken from the bus and shot. After checking the identification cards of all passengers, the guerrillas identified 13 others as CDF members and shot them too. In all, eight civilians were killed and six wounded. We do not know whether all those shot were lined up execution style, as a local newspaper reported, or whether some were shot while trying to flee.

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Perspective— Soviet Involvement in Terrorism

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The nature and extent of Soviet involvement with terrorism are much debated. We know that the Soviets at least indirectly have given material support to terrorists; we do not know how much, if any, direct support Moscow has provided to terrorist groups or individuals. As long as terrorist groups identify ideologically with the Soviet Union and continue primarily to attack non-Bloc targets, however, the Soviets benefit from the disruptive and destabilizing effects of terrorism, which partly explains why they do not support international efforts to combat it.

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Underlying Attitudes

Historically, the Soviet Union has viewed terrorism as a valid weapon to be employed under appropriate circumstances. Lenin and Trotsky rationalized its use and Stalin applied it extensively both inside and outside the USSR. Although the Soviets in recent years have publicly disavowed any connection with international terrorist groups—which they consider to be overly adventurous and ideologically simplistic—they nonetheless consider terrorism to be a manifestation of the internal problems afflicting a declining capitalist society. Moreover, they view the use of terrorist tactics by leftist insurgents as legitimate under many circumstances. Thus they see no reason to cooperate with Western nations in combating terrorism, and they have adamantly opposed most international efforts to outlaw terrorists and eliminate their sanctuaries.

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Where Soviet interests have been specifically threatened, however, Moscow has been more cooperative. Thus the Soviet Union is a party to the international antiskysacking convention. The Soviets, of course, have absolutely no toleration for terrorism in their own or allied countries. In their ideology there can be no justification for terrorism in a socialist state.

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Support of Terrorist Groups

Terrorist Contacts. The Soviets have a long history of maintaining relations with groups that have participated in—or are linked to—terrorism. As far as we can determine, such support—for example, to Palestinian groups—has largely consisted of political backing, funding, and the provision of conventional arms and military training.

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Training. The Soviets continue to train personnel belonging to “national liberation groups”—such as the African National Congress of South Africa—with the knowledge that some of the persons they have trained have later committed terrorist acts. At a minimum, the fact that the Soviets have not ended training for such groups suggests that Moscow is little concerned about the potential misuses of its instruction. It is hard, if not impossible, to verify that the Soviets have conducted training tied specifically to terrorism. The nature of terrorist tactics—bombings, assassinations, kidnappings—does not require any particular kind of training facility. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In any event, this distinction is basically artificial, since whether an act is terrorism or not depends not so much on its nature as on motivation, target, and context. Thus the key is whether Moscow trains people in combat skills knowing that they intend to use this training to engage in terrorist activities. To answer this question, one would need confirmed collateral information from participants or persons close to them. [REDACTED]

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Arms Supply. The Soviets openly supply arms to numerous governments and groups that conduct terrorist actions. These arms often have strings attached, but apparently Moscow does not restrict the end use of the weapons. Libya, a major Soviet arms customer, has supplied numerous terrorist groups from its stockpile. Although we have no indications that the Soviets are using Libya as a front to supply international terrorists, they apparently view Libya’s disbursement of these weapons to terrorist groups with equanimity. [REDACTED]

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We have no reports that terrorists have obtained weapons directly from Soviet sources or that the Soviets have supplied weapons precisely for use in terrorism. The existence of the gray arms market, however, obviates any need for the Soviet Union to risk international disapproval by directly arming known terrorist groups. Tracing the flow of arms from the manufacturer through this market to the terrorist end user is extremely difficult, and any attempt to establish the guilt of the originator founders on the ambiguity the number of intermediaries gives to the gray arms market. Some East European countries deal extensively in the gray arms trade. Bulgaria’s KINTEX and Czechoslovakia’s OMNIPOL are among the more prominent companies whose weapons eventually have appeared in terrorist hands. We doubt that the Soviets would long tolerate such trafficking if they objected to it. [REDACTED]

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The Role of Soviet Surrogates

Soviet influence over Bloc allies, particularly strong in the intelligence and security area, provides Moscow ample opportunity to stimulate Bloc support for terrorist activities. In general, our information on Bloc support to terrorism provides

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extensive evidence of indirect support and only scattered information about direct involvement.

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Do the Soviets Orchestrate Terrorist Acts?

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[redacted] we doubt that conclusive evidence of Soviet orchestration of some act or aspect of terrorism will ever be unearthed. Acquisition of anything closer than thirdhand evidence—if it exists—has been and will continue to be extremely difficult. The small size of most terrorist groups, their compartmentation [redacted] and the likely use of cutouts to conceal any Soviet contacts with terrorists all serve to drastically reduce the prospects for successful acquisition of information. [redacted]

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Furthermore, the Soviets may not need—or even desire—direct control. Many terrorist groups are headed or dominated by borderline psychopaths who are hard to deal with and impossible to control. As long as the terrorists confine their activities largely to non-Bloc countries and base their rationale on some form of Marxist-Leninist ideology, they tend to serve Soviet ends. By simply providing the means to conduct terrorism—training, arms—and by refusing to cooperate with international efforts to cope with the terrorist problem, Moscow has already achieved a great deal and can continue to do so at little political cost. [redacted]

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Saudi Arabia: Attempts To Disrupt the Hajj

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Saudi Arabia's customs and immigrations inspectors, the country's first line of defense against potential troublemakers and terrorists during the Hajj, have been sorely tested during the past few weeks:

- On 17 August, 2 kilograms of Semtex-H, an explosive of Czechoslovak origin, were discovered in the false-sided suitcase of an arriving Afghan pilgrim. [REDACTED]

Saudi security measures are unlikely to deter Libyan and Iranian efforts to make trouble during the pilgrimage. In a speech to his followers in June, Qadhafi said that the Saudis have no right to prevent attacks on Libyan dissidents during the Hajj. Iran had seemed to pose less of a terrorist threat than Libya because Tehran has been trying to improve relations with Jiddah. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] we

suspect the Afghan is an Iranian agent, given Tehran's involvement with some of the Afghan rebels.

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- On 18 August, a Libyan aircraft carrying an "official Hajj delegation" refused to submit to customs inspection, presumably claiming diplomatic status. As many as 1,000 Saudi troops surrounded the aircraft, and Saudi authorities were subsequently allowed to search the pilgrims' luggage. The luggage contained 58 handguns the Libyans claimed were for self-defense against Libyan dissidents. The Libyan delegation was forced to fly home.

[REDACTED]

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- After 18 August, at least four Libyan aircraft arrived carrying young, strapping male pilgrims—unusual since Hajj pilgrims are mostly elderly men and women. The Saudis sent the aircraft back to Libya.
- A Libyan ship carrying pilgrims was refused entry into the port of Jiddah until it submitted to a search. Libyan passengers on the ship reportedly had an altercation with Saudi authorities because they were carrying Qadhafi's "Green Book."

- In late August, Saudi authorities found about 10 kilograms of plastic explosive in the luggage of two Iranian "pilgrims" arriving on a flight from Tehran.

[REDACTED]

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Zaire: The Opposition Turns to Terrorism ☐

Zaire has remained remarkably free of terrorism until this year, but now some militant opposition groups appear to have adopted terrorist tactics in their struggle to overthrow the Mobutu regime. Since January, Mobutu's opponents, encouraged and supported by Libya, have mounted at least five operations against Zairian interests both at home and abroad. Although there is currently no indication that US interests in Zaire are being targeted, the involvement of Libya increases the possibility of violence against US and other Western personnel and facilities in Zaire. ☐

Only a Few Groups Pose Threat

Of the many Zairian opposition groups, only the National Movement of Congo/Lumumba (MNC/L) and some factions of the Front for the National Liberation of Congo (FLNC) appear to be involved—or planning to become involved—in the violence. Although we have little direct reporting on the strategy of the MNC/L, the group demonstrated its violent intentions in March 1984 when it bombed the buildings housing the Voice of Zaire and the Post Office in Kinshasa. The MNC/L, in fact, is the only opposition group that we know has actually mounted terrorist attacks so far. ☐

☐ there may now be as many as eight factions in the FLNC. The two biggest factions are the FLNC organization in Angola (estimated a few years ago to command 3,000 to 7,000 fighters), headed by Mbumba Nathaniel, and the FLNC-Eastern Front in Tanzania, headed by Antoine Kibungu. The somewhat smaller FLNC-Eastern Front was integrated with and subordinated to the FLNC organization in Angola until May 1984, when the groups apparently split. ☐

☐ the leaders of the FLNC organization based in Angola decided in January 1984 to abandon their ineffective semiconventional warfare tactics and turn to guerrilla and terrorist

activities aimed primarily at urban targets. ☐

Libyan Involvement Crucial

A number of President Mobutu's actions have angered the Libyans. Mobutu has strongly backed the Habre regime in Chad, reopened diplomatic relations with Israel, and proposed a black African league separate from the OAU. In retaliation, Libya has provided increased military and terrorist training, equipment, funds, and logistic support to Mobutu's Zairian opponents. Moreover, Libyan agents were probably responsible for a bomb that exploded in Kinshasa's airport in January, causing considerable damage. ☐

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group, the Angolan-based FLNC, has proved ineffective since 1978, and the threat of terrorism from this quarter is probably low. []

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The opposition groups may be weak, but Zaire is nevertheless vulnerable to terrorism. The country's borders are generally poorly controlled—though more carefully watched in the Kinshasa area—and provide ample opportunity to infiltrate men and material. The government appears better prepared to handle the threat of another invasion of Shaba by more or less conventional forces than the threat posed by small terrorist teams. []

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Low Threat to Americans—For Now

We judge that these opposition groups currently pose little threat to US interests in Zaire. They have not traditionally been anti-American, and there is no evidence that they are considering attacks on US targets. Their Libyan backers have become involved in order to harrass Mobutu, not to attack the United States. []

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

Potential for Terrorist Violence Remains Limited

Despite all the Libyan aid and encouragement, the fragmented and disorganized opposition appears to present only a moderate terrorist threat to Kinshasa over the near term. The MNC/L has demonstrated that it is both willing and able to mount terrorist operations with Libyan assistance. The arrest of as many as 10 of its 50 known Libyan-trained operatives was probably not a serious enough setback to make the group abandon its new program, but it may well try to refine its tactics. The larger FLNC—Eastern Front, which has reportedly received similar Libyan training and support is probably capable of mounting comparable operations in Kinshasa and the urban areas of Shaba Province. The largest opposition

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Chronology

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last issue. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included. ☐

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4 July 1984

Portugal: New Attacks by FP-25

In Barcelos, members of the radical leftist group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) fired automatic weapons at a Republican National Guard post. In Mazarefes, a bomb planted by members of FP-25 exploded at the residence of an industrialist. The bomb caused structural damage to his and other nearby homes. ☐

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11 August 1984

Costa Rica: Terrorist Cell Discovered

In San Joaquin de Flores, during a raid on a suspected safehouse, the Rural Guard discovered terrorist paraphernalia and arrested several suspects. The leader of the group of eight to 10 people appears to be a US citizen. ☐

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Mid-August 1984

Portugal: Arrests of Suspected FP-25 Members

On 14 August in Oporto, police arrested a man suspected of being a leading member of FP-25. A subsequent search of his home revealed an arms cache. On 21 August in Lisbon, six people suspected of belonging to FP-25 were arrested. This brings the total number of FP-25 arrests to around 50 since police sweeps began in June. ☐

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Spain: More ETA Bombings

On 16 August in Madrid, a bomb exploded at a trade union office. The same day in San Sebastian another French car was burned. The following day in Salinas police safely detonated a bomb discovered outside the offices of the Popular Alliance Party. On 19 August in Bilbao, a bomb explosion injured a Spanish policeman and an elderly man. On 24 August in Pamplona another bomb exploded in a bar. ETA/Military is believed to have been responsible for all of the bombings. ☐

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21 August 1984

France: Jewish-Owned Bank Bombed

In Paris, a bomb exploded outside a Jewish-owned bank, causing considerable damage but no injuries. No group has claimed responsibility for the explosion. ☐

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22 August 1984	<p>Israel: Bomb Defused in Jerusalem Police successfully defused an explosive device found in the Jewish quarter of East Jerusalem. No group has claimed responsibility for placing the bomb. <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Chile: Syrian Embassy Bombed In Santiago, an explosion at the Syrian Embassy caused property damage but no injuries. No group has claimed credit for the bombing. <input type="checkbox"/></p>	25X1 25X1
23 August 1984	<p>Argentina: Naval Facility Bombed In Mar del Plata, a powerful bomb at the headquarters of the Naval Training Directorate caused structural damage but no injuries. No group has claimed credit for the attack. <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Israel: Bomb Defused In Tel Aviv, police dismantled a small bomb near a snack stand. The bomb, which was probably planted by a Palestinian group, apparently was targeted at Arabs who work in Israeli factories nearby. Police arrested 20 Arabs for interrogation. <input type="checkbox"/></p>	25X1 25X1
25-26 August 1984	<p>Spain: Basque Supporters Protest Extradition Ruling On 25 August in Pamplona and Bilbao, four French-registered cars were burned and hundreds of Basque youths fought with police in protest of the 24 August French court ruling that four Basque separatists should be extradited to Spain. On 26 August in Bilbao, hundreds of Basque youths burned cars and attacked police with gasoline bombs, bottles, and rocks in the second day of protests. Other related acts of terrorism included an arson attack upon a house in Zumaya and the burning of a French-owned car in Pamplona. <input type="checkbox"/></p>	25X1
25 August 1984	<p>Lebanon: Bombs Found in Beirut A Western press service reports Lebanese police dismantled a large bomb found in a suitcase outside Beirut International Airport. Police also found a car loaded with 150 kilograms of explosives near an Army checkpoint in a Shia suburb of Beirut. <input type="checkbox"/></p>	25X1
Late August 1984	<p>Corsica: Yet More Bombings On 26 August in Ajaccio, eight bombs caused serious damage to government and private buildings. On 29 August in Ajaccio four bombs damaged a bank, a police station, a commercial building, and an apartment building but caused no injuries. The bombings mark a resurgence of violence after this month's regional elections in which hardline separatists won three seats in Corsica's assembly. There was no claim of responsibility, but police suspect the attacks were the work of the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC). <input type="checkbox"/></p>	25X1
27 August 1984	<p>Nicaragua: Bomb Explodes in Radio Station In Puerto Cabezas, a bomb exploded in the state-owned "La Voz del Poder Popular," wounding two people and causing an unknown amount of damage. The explosion occurred just a few hours after Daniel Ortega, leader of the ruling junta, ended a presidential campaign visit to the city. <input type="checkbox"/></p>	25X1

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28 August 1984**Iraq: Iranian Hijackers Surrender**

At a military airfield near Baghdad, a young couple who had hijacked an Iranian airliner with 200 people aboard surrendered to Iraqi authorities and released the passengers unharmed. The couple apparently used no weapons to force the diversion and made no demands beyond passage to Kuwait. Although they only went to Iraq after being denied permission to land in Kuwait, Baghdad wasted no time turning the "defection" to its advantage in its propaganda war with Iran. ☐

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Lebanon: Israel Attacks Another Palestinian Base

Israeli aircraft bombed a base occupied by Fatah dissidents near the town of Madjal Anjar in the Bekaa Valley. According to initial press reports, 15 people were killed and 25 wounded. Later, Fatah Deputy Commander Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) said that 80 mainline Fatah members being held prisoner at the base had also been killed in the raid; leading Fatah dissidents, however, denied holding any Fatah members prisoner. ☐

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29 August 1984**France: Basque Supporters Occupy Town Halls**

In Ispoure and in Hendaye supporters of seven Spanish Basque refugees threatened with extradition from France occupied the town halls in a peaceful two-hour protest calling on the government "to spare the refugees' lives by avoiding their extradition to Spain." ☐

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29-30 August 1984**Spain: More ETA Violence**

On 29 August in Usurbil, a French tractor-trailer was burned. In Renteria a bank was robbed. On 30 August in Bilbao, a bomb exploded at a Peugeot-Talbot car showroom, damaging the building and 10 cars. ETA/Military is believed to have been responsible. ☐

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30 August 1984**Colombia: Hostage/Barricade Situation Peacefully Resolved**

In Bogota, 11 members of the Secretariat of the Coordinating Board of Colombian Civic Movements, a previously unknown group, occupied the Consular Section of the French Embassy and took five hostages. The self-described "labor organization" apparently took this step to protest civil rights violations by the Colombian Government. After negotiations between the occupiers and security forces who surrounded the installation, the government agreed to address their grievances and gradually withdrew the security forces. The occupiers then slipped away, leaving the hostages and the building unharmed. ☐

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